There is a core conflict between conventional ideas about "meaning" and the phenomenon of meaning and meaning change in history. Conventional accounts are either atemporal or appeal to something fixed that bestows meaning, such as a rule or a convention. This produces familiar problems over change. Notions of rule and convention are metaphors for something tacit. They are unhelpful in accounting for change: there are no rule-givers or convenings in history. Meanings are in flux, and are part of a web of belief and practical activity that is in constant change. We can perhaps salvage some point to appeals to fixed frameworks if we treat them as "as if" constructions designed as crutches to enable us to improve on literal readings of the texts by making more sense of the inferential connections and practical significance of their content at the time.
Whether arguments command assent or not depends less upon the logic that conveys them than upon the climate of opinion in which they are sustained. What renders Dante's argument or St. Thomas' definition meaningless to us is not bad logic or want of intelligence, but the medieval climate of opinion-those instinctively held preconceptions in the broad sense, that Weltanschauung or world pattern-which imposed upon Dante and St. Thomas a peculiar use of the intelligence and a special type of logic. To understand why we cannot easily follow Dante or St. Thomas it is necessary to understand (as well as may be) the nature of this climate of opinion. 5 The climates of opinion of the past no longer "impose" themselves on anyone, but they are in some sense accessible to us as objects, fixed objects which on the one hand explain the thinking of the past and on the other enable us to interpret it.
The problem of the static character of these objects, including not only meaningbestowing objects as world-views, but also the words on which meaning is bestowed, runs very deep, with various surface manifestations. These manifestations appear most familiarly in the historiography of science. In the 1960s Paul Feyerabend made the then revolutionary claim, against the idea that more advanced theories explained less advanced theories by derivation, that at least some large class of theories were not about the same thing as the theories that preceded 5 C. Becker, The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth-Century Philosophers (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1959 [1932 ), 5. them, because the meanings of the terms had changed in the course of the advance. 6 In the hands of Thomas Kuhn, this thesis became the positive theory that the meanings of scientific terms were given by paradigms, which were themselves, among other things, structures of assumptions shared by a given scientific community.
These were accounts of difference. But there was an underlying conflict between the fixed character of meaning-bestowing facts, the conventions, rules, and frameworks, and the facts of change that they were supposed to help account for. Kuhn could not conceive of these meaning-bestowing assumptions as changing in a normal way, in the way that ordinary explicit beliefs changed in the face of new evidence or new considerations. Because they were at a tacit level, and were constitutive of the meaning of the new evidence and the new considerations, they were necessarily immune to revision by new evidence or considerations, and consequently could only change holistically, by revolutions that installed new constitutive meaning-bestowing assumptions.
Meanings and Frameworks: the Temporal and the Atemporal Meet
Rules, conventions, frameworks, world-views and the like explain meanings, and also give us access to meanings. The means of understanding and explaining are fixed. But the "meanings" that they explain are themselves things that change. This produces two problems: one having to 6 P. Feyeraband, "Explanation, Reduction, and Empiricism" in H. Feigl and G. Maxwell do with explanation, and explanatory regresses, and the other having to do with access. The problem of access takes two forms: where do we get access to the meanings of texts or actions in history and how do we get access to the rules, conventions, assumptions, and so forth governing the meanings? The relation between these two problems of access is muddled, and so is the relation between these problems and the problem of explaining the facts of rules, conventions, and frameworks and the way they change or succeed one another.
The primary problem for the historian is access to the meanings of texts and statements by historical agents. As Skinner puts it, historians face the "obvious difficulty that the literal meanings of key terms sometimes change over time." 7 Indeed, we . . . discover from the history of thought that there are in fact no such timeless concepts, but only the various different concepts which have gone with various different societies, is to discover a general truth not merely about the past but about ourselves as well.
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So conceptual change and conceptual variation is ubiquitous, and the presently understood "literal" meaning of a text from the past may not have had that meaning in the past. In one sense this is a gift or opportunity, if, as Skinner says the "essential philosophical, even moral, value" of "the classic texts, especially in social, ethical, and political thought," is that they "help to revealif we let them-not the essential sameness, but rather the essential variety of viable moral 7 Skinner, "Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas," 31-32.
assumptions and political commitments." 9 Indeed, the exercise can tell us something about ourselves that may have been previously hidden from us, namely the fact that we assumed and politically committed to a different framework. In either case, we are compelled, in order to understand the language as it was written, to refer to something else, something that does change, namely assumptions, commitments, conventions, and so forth. The explanation of the meaning of the literal words is referred back to the thing that did change, namely the framework.
Skinner has written much more since these arguments were originally given, and we may reasonably ask whether his views have changed in ways that make any difference. Tarcov's comment begins to show a way out of the muddle, by implicitly separating two things: the supposed historical facts about assumptions, climates of opinion, worldviews, conventions, and whatnot on which interpretation allegedly depends, and the banal stuff of dictionary definitions, which are clearly reconstructions, approximations, and simplifications of actual semantic usage, usually, given the didactic aims of dictionary writers, with a strong whiff of the normative, not to say the snobbish. Although dictionary definitions are an aid to getting at the meaning of something, but only that-a practically indispensable short cut for the non-native speaker that can never be regarded as wholly adequate as a guide, rather than a fact about something in the heads or the social world of the historical agents whose words are being interpreted. In short, assumptions, climates of opinion, and the like are doing double-duty, as means of interpretation that provide access to meanings and as (perhaps bogus) explanatory concepts; in contrast, dictionary definitions are post hoc simplifications that explain nothing, but help provide access to what people mean. What people mean does not depend in any explanatory way on these definitions; rather, the construction of the definitions depends on what people mean.
This allows us to rethink the muddle with which this section began. The problem of access involves two things that need accessing: the meanings of texts or actions in history and the rules, conventions, assumptions, and so forth governing the meanings. The standard account reasons that one must first access the conventions and then use this knowledge to determine the meanings of the terms and speech acts. The dictionary model, if we can call it that, works the other way around: it proceeds from actual usage and reconstructs definitions from what is actually said and how terms are applied. The reconstructed definitions can then be re-used to understand other texts. The actual process of making sense of the texts, and the material on which the interpreter works, are the same in both cases: there is no direct access to conventions, rules, assumptions, and the like-they are simply inferred from usage, just as dictionary definitions are. The only difference is in the status of these things as theoretical objects-namely, as explainers. Dictionary definitions are idealizations of usage; conventions and rules are bestowers of meaning that lie behind and explain usage in its normative aspect. It doesn't matter that the dictionary definition is fixed-the definition is self-consciously retrospective, though these definitions can be taken as norms, if someone chooses to be didactic about correct speech.
It does matter that meaning-bestowing rules, frameworks, and so on are fixed: they are supposed to account for an infinitude of possible applications. So the difference between the two is a matter of explanatory status. This is not an approach that "rule" theorists of meaning will accept. For them, mere reconstruction is not enough. Their reasoning is, oddly enough, temporal. And they insist on something analogous to agentic powers. For them, there is no meaning without rules, or something like rules, which lie behind and give meaning to a sentence or concept, warranting the infinitude of its application. These have to be there in the first place, in order for a term to mean anything. Rules, or whatever assures meanings, are in the realm of fact, or at least of normative fact, and they have a special explanatory job-they explain the normative fact of a speaker's meaning. For these thinkers, the explanatory regress is central: the whole point of a theory of meaning is to provide the right kind of explanation. Dispositions are the wrong kind. Rules are the right kind. But these are odd explanations. They depend on a special kind of analogy. The terms assumption, presupposition, rule, and the like are terms with an explicit sense, which is being extended to a sense which is tacit, and entirely a matter of ascription by the analyst. There is no explicit rule governing usage, nor are there assumptions actually made, as one might make a stipulation in a legal proceeding, nor are there actual conventions, as there are in international law, made by entering into covenants with others. One can give a definition of a word, but the words we normally use aren't "defined" for us by anyone. Rather, these terms are all analogies, which point to supposed tacit facts that shadow and give meaning to the things they explain, rather than the kinds of rules, conventions, and assumptions that are made in historical moments, by temporal acts of enactment, agreement, or statements of what one will assume. So this analogy is odd in another way: the normal use of the term refers to an act in history; the analogical use to the results of an act which is outside of history.
So how do rules, conventions, and the like relate to, or enter, history? The answer, if we follow the metaphorical usages, is some variant of this: they may be adhered to or assumed by different people or groups at different times, and these acts of adherence or assumption are historical. As intellectual objects they are historically inert and changeless. Terms like "adhere" simultaneously serve as substitutes for a genuine explanation and point to the analogical character of the whole picture of concepts in society of which it is a part. To bridge the gap between the atemporal character of the explanatory concepts themselves and the fact of their historical location in groups requires some sort of analogy to the convenings that produce conventions, or the rule-givers who produce rules. But there are none. This is explanation by myth.
Behind the Dictionary
The "rule" theorists of meaning nevertheless have a point, which can be put in the form of a question. What is it that the dictionaries reconstruct into meanings? Their answer is "rulefollowing speech behavior." So for them, rules have to be part of the story. Is there an alternative? A simple alternative answer, suited to the idea of dictionary definitions as reconstructions of usage, might be this: language is "intelligible speech." We understand what people say, including the extended usages, "erroneous" usages, misapplications of terms, and so forth. Many of the extensions of application we understand are analogical or metaphorical.
Sometimes we make sense of what we are told by treating it as intelligible error. Sometimes it is not so much error as a novel but intelligible extension of the application of the term. Once the extension becomes widely enough used, or used by acceptable people, it can be entered into the dictionary. The dictionary is not a framework, or at least not the kind of framework that is prior to the meaning, but it is a means of gaining access to the meaning of an expression used by a person in the historical past.
This sense of language, as what is intelligible at a given time, does enter into history, at least on occasion, as the subject matter of history. It is an explicit part of the history of law, for the simple reason that legal concepts have to be extended to apply to new cases. Sometimes these extensions have dramatic consequences. One might give as a paradigmatic and historically interesting example Max Weber's dissertation in the history of commercial law. 20 Weber's problem was to identify the processes by which the law of corporations developed, which is first and foremost a matter of making contracts that distribute liability.
A similar problem arises in terms of the history of legal personality: in Roman times, it extended to the whole of the household of the free man, including the persons of his slaves, wife, and children. Over time, this diminished to the modest "person" we have today, whose right even to self-defense is circumscribed. At the same time, more categories of people acquired these rights. This case involves another process of meaning change that applies very generally as well:
changes in the beliefs about classes of people or things lead to the extension of meaning to these things. The morality of slavery was challenged by writings like Uncle Tom's Cabin because they humanized the slave, bringing them into the category of beings for whom notions of rights and human dignity could be appropriately applied. Something similar might be said for the application of the concept of the soul: when different groups were taken to have souls, the usual meanings that applied to possessors of souls also applied to the newly recognized possessors of souls.
There is an interesting literature in history itself on another kind of change, the problem of oppositions, or counterconcepts, such as civilized and barbarian, associated with Rienhardt The interesting feature of these counterconcepts is that they persist because they make some sort of useful distinction. But when we characterize something as a barbaric practice, we no longer have in mind the barbarians that the Greeks made the contrast with, nor the ones the Romans did.
So the distinction persists, but the objects of the distinction change, and the intentions behind using them change as well: what sort of negation or refutation is involved is not determined by the term, but by the intelligible use to which it is put. To call one's political opponents barbarians is often merely to announce that one is not going to treat them civilly.
The mechanisms by which terms get extended and concretized in new ways are well known. Metaphors end up as mundane usages: philosophical terms such as true and norm, for example, are carpentry terms. The language of political theory and law, including notions like sovereignty, bodies, the nation, and so forth derive by more or less visible past steps of extension from the concept of the monarch, the medieval problem of the king's two bodies, and metaphors The common thread in all these cases of change is this: the novel application, extension, or usage needs to be intelligible at the time the extension is made. It must at least be intelligible to the speaker or author. And these usages are normally directed at an actual audience, which will understand them or not. To imagine otherwise is to imagine an author writing for an unknown audience. But unless the author had some idea of what the audience would understandunless it was a hypothetical audience constructed on the model of an actual audience that would take the terms in known ways-the author would be faced with the problem of communicating with an audience which might take the words in hitherto unknown ways. Nor is this an empty fear. Nietzsche's counter-genealogies of terms were designed to illustrate this point. And there are many other cases. Terms like objective and subjective reversed meanings in the course of their history. Terms like propria and manner went from being descriptive terms for individual conduct to terms like proprieties and manners that came to describe abstract de-individualized normative standards. Each step in the evolution of these terms is intelligible, in the sense that we can provide a reconstruction of the way in which the extension made sense to its author and to some possible audience at the time of the extension.
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This leaves us with a stark and problematic opposition: between the sense of meaning bound to the ongoing process of making intelligible utterances, which is a sense of meaning in the flux of speech and understanding, and the fixed sense of meaning captured through the identification of conventions. The distinction is between this practical ability and its theoretical reconstruction. The ability is in flux; the reconstruction is fixed, but also fails to ever adequately capture the practical ability to understand and to be understood. If we leave the issue with this contrast between the flux of meaning and the necessarily false theoretical reconstruction of meaning, however, we still face some muddles. There is a long tradition of thinking that meanings, once established, cannot be lost: Mill gave an account of this, influenced by Coleridge, and one can find similar ideas in many other writers, including
Heidegger. Indeed, the nineteenth century passion for philology reflected a kind of mysticism about the recovery of meanings which implied some sort of notion of meaning as hidden in the remains of texts, which the later reader can unlock. And there is a problem here, however muddled. We live with texts from the past. We read them, interpret them in order to appeal to them as interlocutors and, in various contexts, including the law and religious settings, as authoritative. At first blush, this is a problem that arises from the fact that there are texts: literate societies have this problem of the ongoing transformation of intelligible speech, the flux of meaning as intended and understood by speakers, and the contrasting fixity of the written word.
And indeed there is a sense in which the problem of meaning vanishes if we are in an entirely oral world, in which nothing is preserved which could have a meaning that differs from the meanings of the present. But even in the world of orality, there is an analogous problem: epic poems that are repeated according to formula become archaic, and have contents that may no longer mean, in the flux of speech, the same thing, or anything at all. But in this case the muddle is not about theoretical objects, "rules" and the like. It is about actual forms of expression-epic poems and texts-that happen to be transmitted in a different way than the ordinary flux of usage, and detached from the practical knowledge of the original users.
The Mystery of Practical Knowledge
Consider a real historical problem about the fighting ship of antiquity, the Trireme. We know the Greek word from the texts. The name refers to the three levels of oars. We know from the context and what is said about them that it is a ship with specific properties. We have plenty of pictures on ceramics. But we lack the practical knowledge that the Greeks themselves had, of making these objects, and of operating them. The knowledge was lost in late antiquity. In the 1980s, a project attempted to reconstruct a trireme based on ancient sources, which included images and a great deal of recorded "literal" information about the capabilities of the vessel, together with the present knowledge of naval architects. The vessel, the Olympias, was subjected to sea trials, including one with a crew of 170. The sea trials showed that the reconstructed vessel had many of the capabilities attributed to the ancient triremes, including their recorded straight line speed and their ability to turn 180 degrees quickly. Some things could not be duplicated, notably the bracing ropes, which had to be replaced by steel cables which did not flex with the hull as the original natural fiber rope did. "means" for a trireme with a large number of oarsmen? Or do we now at least have a much better theory, and better practical knowledge, because the theory and practical knowledge which we now have does a better job than previous theories of accounting for such things as the recorded capabilities of these ancient vessels? It seems clear that the answer is that we have a better theory, as well as a good surrogate for some of the practical knowledge which was lost. The
Olympias is an "as if" trireme, one that is reconstructed "as if" it were the same as the ancient one. It is a functional substitute for the ancient ones, designed to have the same properties, and also to resemble the ancient images and conform to the properties in the ancient texts. It is constructed for us, by us, and with the materials available to us from the evidence available to us.
Aside from these tests, we can never know if the reconstruction is correct. Our reconstructed trireme is outside of the flux of intelligible discussion and practical knowledge that ended in late antiquity. We can guess that it is close enough that it would be recognized as a trireme, but this depends on whether the theory and the practical knowledge on which the reconstruction is based is right: another reconstruction might produce a vessel with sufficiently different features that the ancient mariner would find it acceptable and the Olympias an anomaly. We cannot test that meaning hypothesis.
The Olympias is literally a model: it is not an exact model, but a kind of ideal-type of the ancient trireme, which, as it happens, we can experiment on. It uses different material for lines, and thus flexes differently. But this is a kind of difference we understand in our own terms.
There is a lot about the physical act of rowing we understand as well, so we know what the differences between our experience of rowing and what that of the smaller men of the ancient world would have been. So in constructing and using this model we rely on a background that does not change, and to a large extent is not a matter of theory. The physicality of the act of rowing, of the features of sea water and wind, are all part of the background that we don't need to alter or account for. We know a bit about the properties of wood in sailing vessels, and have reason to think that the wood used for the model is close enough to the original, though like the bracing ropes it is not the same. But we have tested the theory with this model. And we can say that we know better what "trireme" meant as a result. We have more confidence in the meaning of ancient texts about sea battles, and we may be able to make sense of previously obscure passages and claims.
At the same time, we know that this is only a model, and that we are missing a vast amount of practical knowledge and oral content-the kind that is preserved, at least partially, for the period 1800-1813 in the Aubrey-Maturin series of historical novels by Patrick O'Brian, and by the passed down practical knowledge and vocabulary of the sailors who continue to sail the "Tall Ships" that most navies still maintain. We know that techniques and practical knowledge must have changed and varied over the millennia during which the trireme was used, and among the navies that used them. This vast web of usage and knowledge, which was oral or largely so, is what is lost, and for which our model ship is a substitute of limited value. We had to import our own oral tradition, and indeed the physical experience of rowing under command and giving commands, to actually get the trireme through its sea trials-we had to use our language, and our nautical language, as a functional substitute for the one that the ancient mariners possessed, in order to sail the model trireme, along with our functional knowledge and the knowledge concealed in the tools and materials we used to create the model.
Meaning Without Theory?
The Olympias is a model, made with a combination of physical elements, some of which are close to those we believe to be characteristic of triremes in the ancient world, some of which are functional substitutes with different properties. Not everything is the same, nor does it need to be, for the purpose at hand. And what is this purpose? To see if the model as constructed could perform as the ancient sources said the trireme performed, and thus test our theory of trireme construction. By having the model, some of the missing links in our understanding of ancient navies could be filled in. But we also know that this is an artificial model. We think we know enough to correctly conclude that certain functional substitutes, such as the steel cables, won't affect the experience. One aspect, perhaps not the most obvious but nevertheless essential to its character as a test, was the human element of the sea trials-the test of whether actual rowers could actually make the model trireme perform the feats that the ancient texts recorded. The real rowers were of course themselves "models" in a sense: it was known that ancient rowers were smaller, and this needed to be taken into account. Nevertheless, if the test had required capacities that were physically impossible for accomplished rowers, the model as a whole would have failed the test. And we would again be unable to say that we knew any better than before what trireme meant in these ancient texts.
The situation with the model is similar to the situation we have with appeals to convention, presuppositions, and the like. They are as artificial as the Olympias. But if they work, in this case to illuminate and enable the kinds of inferences that make the texts intelligible to us, they do their job of explaining how the authors could reason as they apparently did-to come to the novel conclusions that Machiavelli and Hobbes did, for example, or to the conventional but alien conclusions of other authors. In short, we can use "as if" constructions, and we do: it is "as if" people were following conventions, had coherent world views, scientists had paradigms, and what not, as long as these crutches get us where we want to go-to the facts about what someone meant. Once established, these meaning hypotheses can receive additional support, by making sense of more texts, and eventually depend less on the scaffolding of "as if"
statements that were needed to reconstruct the meaning in the first place. Perhaps this deepened understanding would allow us to detect nuances of change and variation that can enable us to come closer to the fluid and variable "meanings" of actual speech and communication of the historical addressees, rooted in a distinctive set of experiences, and so forth.
With this kind of knowledge, we would approximate the situation of a person who was capable of interacting with the authors in their own era, and possessing the practical knowledge that gives meaning to the terms, such as "feather." And this was the goal with using actual rowers to do the work of the ancient rowers-to provide substitutes who would have to be able to do what the ancient rowers did, to not only lift the oars, but to respond to the commands. To be sure, we are limited in our ability to test our understanding. The dead cannot talk back. And we cannot be sure that the samples of material on which we are working, the texts, represent fairly the experiences we would have had if we were interacting. We are even more limited when the material itself is limited, as with the ancient world. But this is a difference of degree: interaction with the living itself provides only a sample, and not every aspect of our understanding is subject to test in these interactions.
So what is the lesson of all this? Making historical claims about what some past thinker meant on the basis of a theory of meaning seems to make history depend on the validity of particular kind of metaphysics, at least a metaphysics of meaning, and thus to lose its independence from philosophy. There is the danger that in using such notions as convention, as
Skinner does, one is elevating the (inevitably passing) philosophical language of one particular era to the status of universal historical truth. With Skinner's original writings, this has perhaps already happened: Skinner has to explain the history of speech act theory to explain his former views and what he now claims. If we are treating claims about conventions and the like as an "as if" serving our particular purposes of understanding, however, we can accept the utility of these notions, if indeed there is the payoff of an improvement in understanding over the literal reading, that is to say if the texts make more sense and reveal more connections in the web of belief and practical action. We should, however, take "literal" literally, to refer to the contrast between writing and speech. 
